NGOs in the European Union. by Greenwood, Justin
GREENWOOD, J. 2018. NGOs in the European Union. In Kellow, A. and Murphy-Gregory, H. (eds.) Handbook of 
research on NGOs. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing [online], pages 391-403. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785361685.00027 
NGOs in the European Union. 
GREENWOOD, J. 
2018 
This document was downloaded from 
https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
This is a draft chapter / article. The final version is available in Handbook of research on NGOs edited by A. 
Kellow and H. Murphy-Gregory, published in 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781785361685.00027. 
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for 
private use only. 
1 
 
NGOs in the European Union: between institutionalisation and participation1 
Justin Greenwood 
Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, UK 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the European Union (EU) are widely 
understood as non-producer actors.  A landmark paper from the European 
Commission (responsible for initiating EU legislation) in 2000, ‘The Commission and 
NGOs: building a stronger partnership’, issued in the names of the President and 
Vice-President, grappled with definitional issues over the course of two pages, finally 
settling on 
 
NGOs are not self-serving in aims and related values.  Their aim is to 
act in the public arena at large, on concerns and issues related to the 
well-being of people, specific groups of people or society as a whole.  
They are not pursuing the commercial or professional interests of their 
members (European Commission, 2000, p.4) 
 
Notwithstanding a failure to recognise that NGOs can be factional, the key point 
from the quotation involves the delineation of NGOs from organisations pursuing 
commercial or professional interests.  A number of producer organisations at EU level 
sought in the past to claim the trophy standing of ‘NGO’ by asserting their legal 
status, electing for the ‘NGO’ category on the EU’s Transparency Register2, an 
                                       
1 Paper adapted from entry in the Handbook of Research on NGOs (Edward Elgar) 
Aynsley Kellow & Hannah Murphy-Gregory (eds., 2018/19), for the XXVth 
Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Brisbane, July 
21-25, panel 38.06 on NGOs & Business in Policy Making 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do 
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incentivised public information register about lobby organisations and their activities 
which over 11,000 (including around 3,000 in the NGO category) have elected to join.  
The claim of NGO status by producer organisations was particularly acute when the 
Register previously carried the incentive that the NGO category were excused from 
declaring lobbying spending (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013).  The Transparency 
Register offers the advice that ‘the decisive factor should be what you do, not your 
legal status’ (European Commission, 2017a, p.6).   
This chapter follows the above definition from the European Commission and 
NGOs in its selection of coverage.  The definition allows for the inclusion of 
consumer protection groups, even though stricto sensu the focus of their work would 
place these groups as interests working in the producer domain.  There is a mature 
community of NGOs fitting the European Commission definition established and/or 
working at EU level.  These can be divided into five categories.  The first, and most 
typical, are mostly confederations, i.e. associations of associations (mainly national, 
but also including in membership regional or other European associations).  
Commission policy documents in the 1990s stated a preference for confederations 
over other types of interest organisations (European Commission, 1992; European 
Commission, 1997), and laboured long over the representativeness of such 
organisations in the hope of some kind of streamlined corporatist style dialogue.  The 
European Commission is a large and diverse organisation, and there remain pockets 
of quasi-corporatist practice involving individual Commission departments, and lead 
NGOs.  A second category involves a smaller number of EU NGOs which have made 
a niche from not being confederated, such as the European Citizens’ Action Service 
(ECAS) and the Permanent Forum of Civil Society, each of which stress the 
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importance of EU institutions having mechanisms which link them directly with 
citizens, although these NGOs themselves carry only token membership from 
individual citizens.  A third category, also with offices in Brussels, are international 
NGOs with policy offices, which include Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace, Transparency International, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF).  
These all have some degree of institutionalised relationships with the main EU 
decision making bodies, but a more recent trend has been the establishment in 
Brussels of a fourth category, a small number of fiercely independent professionalised 
social movement organisations with an anti-globalisation outlook.  These latter 
organisations start with the outlook that the EU concept is part of the liberal tradition 
of globalisation they shun, and are more likely to ‘shout abuse through the letter box’ 
(Jordan and Halpin, 2003) of EU institutions than to act as a critical friend.  
Nonetheless, there are some signs that even such organisations have become drawn 
into the ‘Brussels bubble’ through detailed legislative advocacy work, rather than 
early day tactics of occupying offices of business associations.  The fifth category, 
described later, involves NGOs established at national level and working in EU policy 
issues, almost entirely based in the EU member states, although often working on EU 
issues more in a policy implementation than policy advocacy role. 
A population of NGOs working at EU level mainly comprised of confederations, 
and policy branch offices of international NGOs, means that there is a limit to the 
extent to which dialogue between political institutions and NGOs radiates out to civil 
society more widely comprised.  Rather, the priority for NGOs is advocacy, 
articulated by the lead environmental NGO at EU level in conversation with a 
researcher: 
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While ideally it would be good to get people involved, time pressures 
mean that the most effective use of my time is to get on with advocacy.  
In the end my role is not to encourage the most participatory 
governance, but to ensure the best results for the environment’ 
(Sudbery, 2003:90) 
 
The result is an ecosystem known as the ‘Brussels bubble’ based around an intensive 
policy orientated dialogue between political institutions and organisations with a 
Brussels office.  Despite the aspiration of EU political institutions that their dialogue 
with NGOs would help with participative (input) legitimacy and have some effect in 
radiating out to civil society (European Commission, 1997), the dialogue mainly helps 
with output legitimacy (to do with the technical quality of public policies), and with 
political support, described below.  The 1993 policy document issued by the European 
Commission, ‘An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special 
interest groups’ (European Commission, 1993) marked the start of attempts to put 
informal policy exchanges on a more formalised and transparent basis. 
The EU ecosystem for NGOs 
The commentator quoted above was from the European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB), established in 1974 at the initiative of the European Commission in search of 
an organisation capable of providing it with both expert technical information and 
political support for its expansionist ambitions in European integration.  
Environmental policy is one of the most popular competencies for the EU to hold, 
because it passes the added value test of acting at the transnational level; pollution is 
no respecter of national boundaries.  Consequently, the European Commission chose 
to be an activist in the field at an early stage, in search of further European integration 
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by building on fertile territory.  It hoped that national members of the EEB would 
lobby EU member states to support the Commission’s ambitious environmental policy 
positions in the co-legislative (with the European Parliament) Council of Ministers, 
countering some of the more conservative lobbying by producer organisations against 
environmental protection measures.  The international environmental protection 
NGOs joined the fray in the 1980s, establishing policy offices focused on advocacy 
with EU institutions, and capable of bringing its network into EU policy work with 
national governments.  These organisations bring substantial resources into EU 
advocacy; WWF currently has 43 staff working from its Brussels office (WWF, 
2017).  There are ten lead environmental organisations in the loosely co-ordinated 
‘Group of 10’ network, which met every month to co-ordinate their activities, and 
who between them have over 130 staff.   
Whilst environmental NGOs are the strongest segment of EU representation, a 
similar pattern on a smaller scale can be found in other ‘sectors’ of NGO 
representation.  In Social Policy, for instance, the European Commission stimulated 
the formation of the Platform of European Social NGOs (‘Social Platform’) at the 
head of a ‘family’ of other NGOs working in the social policy field.  There are other 
families of NGOs working in the field of human rights, culture, lifelong learning, and 
development, of which the latter, CONCORD, is the most established (dating from the 
1970s) and co-ordinated.  The corresponding service of the European Commission 
meets regularly with the counterpart family head.  In the field of social policy and 
development there are more institutionalised links which include development NGOs 
undertaking a substantial role in EU policy implementation.  Among the NGOs there 
is a ‘family of families’ of NGOs, Civil Society Europe, which seeks an 
institutionalised ‘Civil Dialogue’ with EU institutions, aspiring to a more formal 
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status to the relatively informal exchanges which take place between NGOs and civil 
society.  Civil Society Europe is based around its network of 31 network 
organisations, including the Green 10, Concord and the Social Platform.  The Social 
Platform has historically been the lead family in pursuit of a formal civil dialogue 
status, inspired by the EU ‘social dialogue’ between employer organisations and trade 
unions and which has a much greater formal status and powers (Greenwood, 2017).  
Article 11(3) of the Treaty on European Union mandates EU institutions to ‘maintain 
an open, transparent and regular dialogue with their representative associations and 
civil society,’ but stops short of specifying what the effect and status of that dialogue 
should be.   
Measures to promote transparency have been a common, and incrementally 
developing, element to underpin all of the exchanges between political institutions 
and outside interests.  There are registers of expert and advisory groups, on which 
advocacy groups sit alongside national government officials and other experts, with 
each group making its minutes, and declarations of interests, available online. 
Commissioners, and their staff, make declarations of meetings with advocacy 
organisations on their web sites.  There is a vigorous and contentious freedom of 
information (in EU speak, ‘Access to Documents’) regime governing EU institutions, 
allowing NGOs (and others) to address any asymmetries of information, and which 
has given rise to a specialist NGO dedicated to expanding the regime and to 
encouraging public use of the instrument through its custom website Ask the EU.org.  
The Transparency Register contains declarations by interest organisations which 
cover the main EU initiatives followed by the organisation, participation in EU 
structures and platforms, membership, staffing, and lobbying spending 
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The NGO Category of the Transparency Register is its fastest growing segment 
(European Commission, 2017b).  The register has been significantly cleaned up as a 
public information tool since the days when a perverse incentive populated the 
category with producer organisations.  The register as a whole now carries significant 
incentives for organisations to join it, to the extent that it can be considered as 
inclusive of the main organisations which lobby EU institutions (Bunea, 2017).  
Whilst there remains some ‘noise’ on the register of organisations motivated more by 
the opportunity for free publicity than by working links to EU public policy, the 
register contains some useful data.  There are 3,000 organisations in the NGO 
category of the register, accounting for over a quarter of all entrants.  261 of these 
have an office in Brussels, with the remainder based primarily in Europe.  An 
indicator of active lobby organisations are those with accreditation to hold day passes 
to the European Parliament, of which there are 635.  Holding a pass makes it possible 
to enter the campus of the European Parliament building for a day, with access to 
most areas, whereas the alternative requires a specific appointment with someone in 
the EP for the designated time period.  A day pass thus carries a significant incentive 
for advocacy organisations, for whom ad-hoc contact with MEPs, their assistants, 
political advisors, and EP personnel, adds value to their work.  NGOs with pass 
holders hold an average of 2.8 passes each, providing some indication of the extent to 
which NGOs devote resources to work with the European Parliament. 
The European Parliament has generally been held to be the friend of ‘diffuse 
interests’ (Pollack, 1997; Duer and Mateo, 2014), particularly where issues become 
highly salient when the EP needs to parade its credentials as the people’s tribune.  
This is of central importance to the EP, as fewer than half of EU citizens show up to 
vote in EP elections.  Sub Committees in the EP have proved a fruitful means of 
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agenda-setting for NGOs (Greer, 2009), from which the EP calls on the European 
Commission to bring forward legislative and policy initiatives.  There are however 
also assessments claiming that the European Parliament has been tamed by its growth 
in legislative powers into being a ‘responsible legislator’ (Burns and Carter, 2010; 
Burns et al, 2013).  There are also assessments in between these two positions, 
highlighting again the importance of salience in determining whether the EP takes up 
a pro-business (low salience) or pro-NGO (high salience) position (Rasmussen, 2014).  
More generally, the importance of salience has become established in the literature 
about the impact of organised interests on EU policy making (Klüver, Braun & 
Beyers, 2015).  NGOs have skilfully deployed framing strategies in order to push 
them into the category of high salience (Börang and Naurin, 2015) 
Many of the NGOs established at EU level arose from efforts to stimulate their 
formation initiated by the European Commission, often during a theme ‘European 
Year of..’.  The European Network Against Racism (ENAR), and the European 
Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) are 
examples of organisations established in this way.   Core funding, as well as task 
specific funding, is provided by the European Commission; for those NGOs which get 
an EU grant it accounts for an average of 43% of their funding (Greenwood and 
Dreger, 2013).  Where an organised advocate is not present and needed, so the EU 
institutions will act to establish one.  Thus, Finance Watch emerged as a consumer 
voice in finance, initially stimulated by Green Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) and then institutionalised with longer term funding by the European 
Commission.   
The international NGOs differ in the extent to which they will accept EU funding.  
Whilst Amnesty International and Greenpeace refuse EU funding on the grounds that 
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it may create the perception of influence, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) and 
Transparency International receive a significant level of funding.  Much of this is 
project orientated, and thus subject to substantial variation.  For instance, according to 
the European Commission funding public database (‘Financial Transparency 
System’), in 2014 FoEE received €6,113,088 whilst the following year it received 
substantially less, €813,720.  Nonetheless the resources provided by EU institutions 
help to sustain an NGO population which is sufficiently resourced to be able to 
engage EU institutions at a level of detail.  Beyond the environmental sector is the 
European Consumers Confederation (BEUC), with 44 staff, and the European Youth 
Forum (EYF) with 25 staff. A number of NGOs have a sufficient level of resourcing 
to be clustered close to the European Parliament building, which is also the most 
expensive property hotspot in Brussels (Palmieri, 2015), often by working in ‘NGO 
houses’ owned or leased by ethical funding investments.  These involve the sharing of 
back-office facilities, but with canteens also, providing an ideal facility for 
networking and purposeful coalition formation, and with the atmosphere of a ‘well 
run students union’ (Ariès & Panichi, 2015).  The modus operandi of NGOs at EU 
level is to pool resources by working in coalitions, within the NGO community itself, 
and with trade union organisations seeking to defend public services.  These venues 
also provide a significant meeting point between institutionalised NGOs and 
professionalised social movement organisations, with organisations such as Friends of 
the Earth performing important bridging roles between the ‘two worlds of collective 
action’ (Hadden, 2015). 
To outside eyes, this extent of funding and institutionalisation of NGOs may 
amount to their instrumentalisation.  However, any cursory glance at the website of 
Friends of the Earth Europe suggests otherwise, with campaigns in evidence which 
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are critical of EU institutions, including the European Commission.  Such NGOs 
understand that their role is to be an unofficial opposition in a political system which 
lacks one, a political system in which decision making is based around a search for 
consensus between three EU institutions.  Nonetheless, funding may bring a 
psychological restraint in the mind of the recipient.  For instance, the European 
Women’s Lobby (EWL), which receives over three-quarters of its income by way of a 
grant from the European Commission, has taken a policy decision not to use litigation 
against the Commission as a means of seeking its goals (Sanchez Salgado, 2014).  It 
also screens potential members for conformity with its goals (Johansson and Lee, 
2014).  The reward for its pursuit of an ‘insider strategy’ is a quasi-monopoly on 
representation (Jacquot and Vitale, 2014).  Because of the perception that funding 
from political institutions might bring constraints, advocacy organisations have in 
recent years accessed a significant number of alternative funding sources 
(occasionally, bizarre – see Politico, 2017), such as trust funds and regular NGO 
funders like the Open Society Foundation. 
NGOs established at EU level are mostly ‘system insiders’ by virtue of their 
incorporation in a labyrinth of Expert Groups and Consultative Committees 
(European Commission) and ‘Intergroups’ (European Parliament).  The 766 
Commission groups are primarily populated by national government experts, but civil 
society organisations provide for the next biggest category of members, with NGOs 
accounting for around one-quarter of all members (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2010).  
Apart from members from public authorities, members are selected through public 
calls for applications.  These groups provide the Commission with non-binding 
‘specialist advice from outside experts as a basis for sound policymaking’ and ‘advise 
the Commission in relation to the preparation of legislative proposals and policy 
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initiatives’.3  Their advice is but one form of input, alongside studies, advice from 
European agencies, public consultations, and hearings.  In the case of the European 
Parliament, Intergroups are informal, cross-party forums for discussion between 
MEPs, and selected others, and whilst they have no role in policy-making they can be 
places to build consensus.  The European Parliament Rules of Procedure for 
intergroups4 records that ‘members may form intergroups for the purpose…of 
promoting contact between members and civil society’.  In practice this means a 
corresponding advocacy group formed at EU level.  NGOs can provide secretariat 
services for intergroups to run, and do so in the case of intergroups on: Animal 
Welfare; Climate Change; Disability; Extreme Poverty.  There are other intergroups 
which are such a close match (Ageing: Children’s Rights; LGBT; Youth issues) to the 
interests of the NGO that the latter has appointed a corresponding EP liaison post.  
Beyond the registered intergroups are (even) less formal ‘interest groups’, which have 
no institutional existence but act as de facto intergroups, because EP rules restrict 
registered intergroups to those with the support of a defined number of members. 
Beyond Expert and Advisory groups are the bilateral exchanges between EU 
institutions and outside interests.  These have increasingly been the subject of 
regulation, through the Transparency Register, transparency declarations by 
Commissioners and their cabinets, and consultation regimes.  Consultation exercises 
feed into impact assessments, which are mandatory for all EU legislative initiatives, 
and published alongside legislative proposals.  The consultation strategy has to be 
announced at the outset of the Commission’s intention to legislate.  Consultation 
                                       
3 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=faq.faq&aide=2 
 
4 Title 1, Chapter 4, Rule 34 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=EN&reference=RULE-034 
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exercises have a public element involving a 12 week internet consultation, with 
(patchy implementation of) the responses published on the consultation website.  The 
Commission is supposed to publish a round-up of the consultation responses followed 
by its own reasoned policy choices, but again implementation of this remains patchy 
(Hüller, 2010; Kohler Koch and Quittkat, 2013). 
The making of EU legislation involves inter-institutional negotiation, mostly 
conducted in ‘trilogues’ (three-way dialogues) between the European Parliament, 
Council of Ministers, and Commission, before the first two of these pass a legislative 
act.  Trilogues have become an instrument to reconcile different positions, such that 
the overwhelming majority of EU legislation is now agreed at first reading between 
the European Parliament and Council of Ministers.  Trilogues provide institutions 
with ‘the space to negotiate’ by happening in secluded settings, involving a legislative 
team from the European Parliament and the rotating Presidency of the EU, 
representing the Council of Ministers.  The institutions like them because they offer a 
speedier way to resolve conflicts, place the negotiators in a direct bargaining position, 
and obscure the deal-making undertaken in order to arrive at an agreement on a 
legislative file.  These factors also make them problematic from a democratic 
legitimacy perspective, a ‘black-box’ of decision-making, where information becomes 
privileged to those with the contacts to obtain it.  Moderately sized civil society 
organisations based in Brussels seem to be able to obtain this information, often in 
returning for providing value-added expert analysis, such that the outcome of 
trilogues provide few surprises.  Beyond this, civil society organisations often act as a 
point of information transfer between the institutions, and sometimes even as political 
emissaries when one institution is trying to influence the other to adopt a particular 
position.  A recognised alliance is between the European Parliament, as the People’s 
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Tribune, and NGOs, seeking to politicise issues in order to gain concessions from the 
Council of Ministers.  One NGO reported during interview that ‘it happens all the 
time that we are political emissaries of the EP with the Council.  I was almost 
negotiating for the negotiator in one case.’5  In this way, civil society organisations, 
including moderately sized NGOs, can play an informal yet institutionalised 
dimension of EU policy making. 
Two other EU organisations in the ecosystem of EU NGOs worth a mention 
include the European Ombudsman, and the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC).  The Ombudsman has generally made common cause with NGOs 
in seeking to enforce and extend the reach of their office, particularly on freedom of 
information related issues. The Economic and Social Committee brands itself as the 
‘house of civil society’, but this needs to be qualified in certain ways.  The EESC was 
established at the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957, reflecting 
corporatist practices of a number of founding EU member states in an institutionalised 
dialogue between producer interests. Members of the EESC are nominated by national 
governments as individuals (rather than delegates of any organisation), and usually 
serve on one of three groups inside the EESC: employer interests; trade union 
interests; and other (diversely constituted, from SMEs to professions to traditional 
advocacy NGOs) interests.  Typically, members are retired from a career with one of 
the types of interests represented by the three groups. The EESC is an advisory body 
only, but its niche is that it brings links to national civil society through the members 
appointed.  There is a liaison group established by the EESC to link with EU civil 
society organisations, but some EU NGOs remain ambiguous about the EESC.  On 
the one hand, it hosts many events, and publishes many reports, which are in the same 
                                       
5 Interview with an environmental NGO, Brussels, 29.9.2017 
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direction of travel as many EU NGOs, particularly about the role of organised civil 
society in the EU.  On the other, EU NGOs are wary about being ‘parked’ at an 
advisory body, fearing it could institutionalise their marginalisation from other, more 
mainstream, EU policy making structures. 
National civil society organisations are generally engaged at EU level by virtue of 
their membership of a corresponding EU association, but a number of national NGOs 
have their own programme of EU orientated activities, with the most active cross-
sectoral voluntary organisations co-ordinating their interests through a European 
Network of National Associations (ENNA).  Many national civil society organisations 
have undertaken a role in the implementation of EU policy making through project 
work (Johansson, 2007), particularly in social inclusion related projects through the 
EU’s ‘Open Method of Coordination’ experiment.  The latter involved a new mode of 
‘soft’ EU policy making, seeking policy implementation through non-legislative 
means, involving national civil society organisations in delivery and overseen by EU 
NGOs such as the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN).  The incorporation of 
EAPN into EU policy implementation is one aspect of its institutionalisation, but 
there is also a ‘revolving door’ of personnel between EAPN and the department of the 
European Commission which deals with Employment and Social Affairs (DG EMPL) 
(Sanchez Salgado, 2014). 
A major change agent in the EU ecosystem involves the introduction by the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), a mechanism which enables 
an initiative collecting the signatures of 1 million European citizens within a 12 
month period to ask the European Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal 
on a topic which falls within the competencies of the EU Treaties.  Whilst the 
measure has no powers of mandation, and only 4 (official) initiatives to date have met 
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the 1 million signature threshold, its direct nature represents a significant departure 
from hoping for democratic effects to be delivered by established practices of 
dialogue between EU institutions and NGO confederations.  The organisation which 
has led the pursuit of a ‘civil dialogue’ status between representative organisations 
and EU institutions, the Social Platform, initially gave a cool reception to the 
introduction of the ECI, asking the European Commission to focus instead on a 
renewed drive for the dialogue (Greenwood, 2015).  After all, initiatives which have 
emerged in the territory claimed by NGOs, but not organised by them, are challenging 
to their legitimacy; one example involves the proposed ECI to ‘End Legalised 
Prostitution in Europe’ came entirely separately from the European Women’s Lobby 
(Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014).  The crowd which has mobilised behind, and 
used, the ECI are generally different from the ‘Brussels bubble,’ although over time 
the institutionalised EU NGOs have joined the fray more, particularly as trade unions 
organised at EU level, and social movements, have used the mechanism.  Thus, the 
Social Platform is listed as a supporter to the trade union organised ECI against water 
privatisation, and the head of the G10 family of environmental NGOs, the EEB, 
joined the unofficial STOP TTIP! ‘self-organised ECI’ campaign as a partner 
organisation. 
In sum, the EU ecosystem can be described as an organised type of pluralism in 
which NGOs flourish.  EU institutions have strived for a population ecology of 
advocacy organisations in which every voice is heard, balanced between producer and 
non-producer interests.  The dialogue between EU institutions and outside interests 
has become progressively institutionalised, underpinned by a common denominator of 
transparency measures.  There are expert/advisory groups which assist the European 
Commission in its task of preparation of legislation, where producer and non-producer 
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interests join with officials from national governments, and individual experts.  
Beyond these are bilateral exchanges between political institutions and outside 
interests, which have become progressively formalised since 1993.  There have been 
some corporatist inspired attempts within the European Commission to organise its 
dialogue (see Kendall and Fraisse, 2009; Obradovic, 2005), but the last of these came 
in the European Commission’s deliberations over its 2001 White Paper on 
Governance.  Nonetheless, there remain relationships between individual departments 
of the European Commission and NGOs which have a quasi-corporatist quality to 
them, most notably in the fields of environmental protection, and social affairs.  The 
2001 White Paper on Governance marked a major drive for the EU to connect with 
wider civil society, and shortly thereafter gave rise to a series of ‘soft law’ rules for 
dialogue between EU institutions and ‘interested parties’, such as consultation and 
transparency related procedures.  These measures placed obligations upon EU 
institutions and civil society organisations, such as the length of consultation, a 
database of expert advisors, and incentivisation for lobby organisations to join a 
public disclosure database.  Civil society organisations have also become 
institutionalised into progressively formalised informal policy-making mechanisms, 
acting as information flows during trilogue negotiations.  The relationship between 
EU institutions and organised interests as a whole has been described as a form of 
‘elite pluralism’.  This label captures aspects of the relationship, but it is more diverse 
than this, ranging from simple instruments of transparency, through to quasi 
corporatist practices.  These structures and relationships make the EU level a thriving 
venue for, and of, NGOs. 
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